No. 28

<Eidetic ontology of the world>[[1]](#footnote-1)

<a) Eidetic ontology of the world starting from nature>

Man in life, that is, being in the occasional context, not only the single one, but the one living in community, and directed towards truth can search an objective truth that can be legitimated for all, one that is universally accepted in this sense.

1. There are unconditionally objective, non-occasional truths for the natural things beyond the formal, the ontological truths (the analytical and synthetical ones), the exactly natural scientific ones - as rules, enabling the construction of his occasional truths to every cognizing subject. They are practically important by that. The man, standing within life, needs the occasional truth everywhere, the prevision of the data of experience, to which all his acting, belonging to the surrounding world, is related. If he is focused on the natural scientific truth as a natural scientifically educated man, then [he is focused] on an index for the corresponding occasional truths that are to be gained intersubjectively and for each of the subjects singly in their inwardliness, and to be gained from the individual situation. If he is focused in a purely theoretical way, then he is simply a clerk of works for theoretical formations of the science. And insofar as it is a proper kind of culture, he works into the cultural surrounding world in its special closedness as a science. But there is not the nature into which he lives and works in many ways, his practical theme. Only the experienced nature can be a practical natural theme. Only this is the actuality of life, as long as it simply is not life of the theoretical scientifician in professional attitude.

As far as I can calculate nature, that far do I have a calculation of human mentality in relation to nature, [324] simply as far as it is an experiencing one possibly conceiving occasional judgements. But that which goes beyond that, that which constitutes the personal mentality else in its life as a human one, like the animal one as well, that sets quite different tasks from experience. A sensuous truth with a sensuous relativity, one of the kind we have in the experiential truth of nature, is missing there, and likewise the relativism of the experiential truths as close and distant truths, again understood in that sense, as it takes place in nature, [is missing].

The Apriori of the constitution of nature as an onto<logical> one belongs to the ontology of the personality, insofar as it is one that cognizes nature, [there] belongs the aesthetical style of the experienceable nature, [there] belongs the theory of the idealization, the stamp of the basic concepts and basic rules of the mathematizing of nature, and thus [there] belongs the ontology of nature itself as a subjective formation of a method, the de facto grounding of which simply is a personal ontology. Of course this implies the psychophysical Apriori as well, the Apriori of bodiliness, body-sensuousness.

1. If we leave out of account the idea of the mathematically truly being nature in itself (mathematical natural science), then this roughly means: We presuppose a certain normality of the sensuousness, we take the persons in a common surrounding world and we abstract under a certain absolutizing of the normal case, that we men among each other are concordant in our experiential judgements (in the verifications of course) and thus are a community of sensuously normal ones. Or: We consider personalities in their community life, as far as it is a community life and [as far as it] as such presupposes a common world as a commonly experienced one.[[2]](#footnote-2) This does not exclude something discordant in the single perceptions and verifications, just as the illusions of every single person [are not excluded], and the like.
2. We presuppose nothing but the man and the surrounding world, namely starting from the de facto experiential world, into which we live and which includes „us“ as men.[[3]](#footnote-3) After a universal [325] description of this experiential world, we then advance to an eidetic variation.[[4]](#footnote-4)
3. The variation of the experienced nature leads to an experiential eidos nature there, which leaves the sensuously genres and differences openly indetermined as contingent material, and thereby leaves open in every possible world of experience that a community of persons is related to the same world of experience, [that it] <can> identify it in its single realities as well, whereas they do not coincide in the specifically sensuous qualities. But if it is taken into the presupposition of a common surrounding world that is verifiable through common experience, that the things of experience are common things in all (in the specific ones as well) sensuous qualities, that is, enable a commonly practical behavior in relation to all, then the contingent qualities cannot change without any rules in the single individuals, that is, not merely in single individuals in communication with one another, nor in the single one in his private experience. There needs to be a difference in the single one in private as well as in the communality between normality and abnormality, and in relation to that a rule of dependence of the bodiliness, characterizing itself then respectively as normal (or normal according to single senses), and abnormal. The community then implies constantly a community of normal ones, the truth of whom is the measure as well for the ones who are abnormal (in single directions). The co-existence of those who are that abnormal that they do not participate in a common world, completely abnormal ones, a common life with whom is excluded, in a world, that is a common world for normal and partially abnormal ones, remains open. That, which we find in the fact, also implies the examplary of the essence. But the question is, what results into a sustaining essence in the fact in variation. The just now exhibited structure in the fact proves itself to be a formal necessity, as good as space and time.

The variation also results in the contingence of every close-distant-givenness, and thereby in that of the close thing that is respectively accepted as a true being (in relation to any practical interest) as an optim<um>. Only the presupposition is needed here that the [326] experiential unity in the change of the „accomodation“ as before, the identity of the object presenting itself in a new approach, is sustained, and the same optimum is sustained in the same closeness as well. We do not get beyond that if we do not transgress the experiential world. It may, with regard to the proximities and distances, always leave open the option that the experientially true thing determines itself anew in a huge approach, if such is possible. The relatedness of the community to the same surrounding world and the option of a practical community life does not suffer through this openness, insofar as a normality is preferred in this regard as well, a normality of the best possible accomodation, and, if means of the accomodation‘s amelioration are to be gained, insofar as each means of amelioration then becomes commonly accessible and the community is always related to a common ordinal sequel of accomodations, to which practical purposes can correspond, or rather, to which the practical purposes themselves adjust.

<b) New beginning in the> eidetic of personality, <of the We and our cultural surrounding world. Difference between formal and eidetic universality. Delimitations and similarities towards the animal world>

Now we try to consider the following. Are we not able to procede, that is what we ask, in the following way? b) We can possibly let go this whole eidetic consideration of nature in merely intersubjective experienciality in advance, instead of starting with it, that is, instead of thoroughly considering the eidetic option of a natural structure of the surrounding world, and to determine its essential form with regard to its givenness of appearance and the somatological of the community. We leave all that indetermined thus, and simply take the presuppositions as a starting point [that] there was a world for humanity as its world, with an experiential truth exhibiting itself or in need of exhibition in its experience. As long as men have been, and wherever they are singly and together, they experience a world; <they> communicate on that and agree, can agree in truth and falseness. They are [327] convinced of that themselves; and it shall be presupposed that it is lastingly that way. We vary this now without investigating its essential conditions in every regard. An experiential world shall be like ours, the type shall be preserved. We are not especially interested in nature in a varying way, but in the personal subjectivity and in the world, insofar as it gains a shape from subjectivity and not as mere nature, and in truth, and the subjective modes that belong to this.

Still we may object to this: Since the world necessarily has a natural structure in the experiential life and thereby in the whole life practice of men, this life cannot help having consideration for this as well. It is there consciously though not abstractively layered, always motivating as well. All eidetic considerations that wish to abstract from it can only have insight and necessity by the view being directed in advance to the aesthetically universal of the experienced nature, and its constantly being preserved in the variation, and by [the fact] that therefore only such determinations are brought in that are scientifically accessible to insight as essentially necessary in thorough eidetic analysis. We indeed cannot speak of the acting man without having regard for orientation, ways of appearance, sensuous abnorm<ality> and normality, and the like. Thus, it is then spoken of without having determined it as an eidetic form in a systematically strict way, and according to its admissible options.

This seems to again lead to the conclusion that nature‘s aesthetic has to precede the eidetic study of human personality as a correlate of a surrounding world being in intersubjective human experience. Still: Even if a consideration of the correlation entering the concretions naturally needs the eidetic of nature, it has still not been said that we could not begin and perhaps have to with some formally universal thing. If the surrounding world remained quite indeterminate in its eidetic essential content, then still a formal „sociology“ would be possible, the „man“ as a personal subject for a formal logic of being (formal ontology), likewise <for a> formal axiology and practice.[[5]](#footnote-5) The only form then, [328] left for this formally considered world, that one presupposing the temporal form as intersubjective. The subject itself would have its formal as an I, as consciousness, as immanent temporal form, as intentional objectivity, as modes of experience, etc., also genesis. But we would thereby not have the „man“, just as little as a human surrounding world.

It makes a difference, whether we rise from the given experiential world with the given men and animals in a concretely varying way towards an essentially necessary idea that puts this concretion into an eidetic system of pure concrete options, or whether we, not sensible for the concrete content, that is, keeping it indeterminately variable, hold on to the formally universal („in a mathematizing way“).[[6]](#footnote-6) Correlatively we then only have a formal idea of the I and the I-community, they are Egos that only experience, verify „something“ as such, etc. and are determined to thereby value and act, etc. Which essential necessities then emerge, closer determining the formal in material regard, if the common world is at first only thought of as a modality of the empty something as such and more closely <of the> temporal something, <under which conditions> a concrete world shall be, and thereby the Ego subjects concretely determinable and determined, this can only be found in the example of a concretion, in a world that is given in an exemplary way, and in concrete description and eidetic variation.

It seems to me that if I still have to acknowledge the right of the preceding formal ontology, that an ontology, starting from positivity and not giving up its standpoint, has to begin as an eidetic, but <as> a formal one of the objective world (the world of an open manifoldness of subjects as such) from pure experience[[7]](#footnote-7) (empiriographically“ eidetic), but at first *in forma*.[[8]](#footnote-8)

[329] This <shall be> understood in the following way: If I vary in eidetic purposes then this may designate: I vary continuously and stick to the coincidence of the possible concretions and <to> the materially common thing which thereby emerges as an eidos. But it may also designate: I vary discontinuously, I do not pay attention to the the concrete content and only stick to the formally empty something as such, but of course as a possible and experienceable one. It does not matter to me whether there are things or men or works of art that I legitimate each in its kind in harmonious experience as something being, or rather, possibly being. Something emerges in the coincidence, some intersubjectively experienceable thing. It is something objectively experienceable as that, predicable, statable in experiential truths.

This implies: If I vary the surrounding world, then I also vary the corresponding subjectivity in the freedom, that permits the identical form „We and our surrounding world“ that has to be kept. And however freely I thereby vary, I am still bound in that each subject of a surrounding world that is truly being in a presupposed way may be experienced in a consequently harmonious way, and shall concord with each other [subject] in that each is able to think on the basis of experience, that is, to form judgements, originally taken from experience and then, as habitual convictions, lastingly or otherwise formed from inspirations of the experience, and possibly then not verified by experience, etc. Here the way opens to the universal formal logic of being (as an empty formal ontology of a possible, still undetermined world) with originally taken basic concepts and principles, with an original noematic, but a formal one of the experiencing and judging personalities cognizing truth.[[9]](#footnote-9) The eidetic consideration of the objectivities thus already demands the consideration of personal formations related to it in the very first universality, that have the character of new, irreal objectivties, and on the other hand the consideration of the persons themselves according to their experientially cognizing performing and the habituality accruing to them.

[330] We can now stop in the formal consideration and consider their <the persons‘> other sides as well, without which a personality cannot be thought of in possible experience and in formal attitude. I could consider: I and a personal subject as such can only have an original experience of myself/itself. This is a formal thesis. Whatever I experience in complete originality as personal, is my own. As a de facto Ego I experience „externally“, I experience that, which is not me, and there belongs the whole world, as far as it is not I, the one that has to count himself among it. If I vary now and presuppose that I remain a subject of a world, this, however I vary it, has to remain in formal universality that I experience a „nature“, in a formal sense of an Ego-foreign sphere of objectivity.[[10]](#footnote-10) Because if I did not experience such a one in my subjective experiencing as an „external [experiencing]“ I could not experience another Ego, since something egoical I originally experience can only be a proper thing. It thus has to be indicated through some „natural thing“ in my own sphere. The indication of something „psychic“ through some non-psychic thing though is only conceivable, if a natural thing experienced by me already indicates a psychic, egoical thing in original indication, i.e. thus, is bound to it in an associative way. But this can only be some proper psychic thing, therefore I need to have a body. And other Ego are only experienceable as bodily, with bodies, having a typical community with mine, and thereby enable the apperceptions „foreign subject“, „foreign bodily psychic man“.

However right this reasoning is, it still draws the attention to the fact that thereby much is already demanded of the Ego in a proper essentially formal way, which priorily had to be exhibited. It already prompts the thought that still some first thing could be a formal egology, and I gain my pure Ego under phenomenological reduction at the example of my de facto Ego, however formally I vary. If I am an Ego at all, then I have to be an experiencing one being able to experience, thinking and being able to think, valuing, wishing. And necessarily always the difference has to remain between my specific egoical, my [331] intentional life, and certain hyletic contents, already having the character of the non-egoical, although <they are> not dispensable for its enabling. I thereby arrive at some formal universal thing that is not bound to the precondition that the I person shall be in relation to some personal objective surrounding world.

(But is it not peculiar that I, as a factual I, as a cultural man, utter predicative truths, lingually thinking, making statements, for an I that is no longer presupposed in this way?[[11]](#footnote-11) Is not the essential form man presupposed, in order that as a variant form of it is cognized an Ego subject as possible and be delimited in a logically scientific way, that no longer is a man - quite as if the mad man, lower animals and that sort of variants are <described> scientifically? But by my, the scientific subject‘s, remaining anonymous, this difficulty does not and the issues connected to that do not become visible and sensible. This is a piece of the naivety that is necessary in the beginning. And it would also belong to it that I then build the logic in a logically thinking way, like <I> already build the whole formal doctrine of the subject according to it in a logically right way, whereas I only gain the logic in the theme afterwards, and the noematic doctrine of right, by which again the whole way towards it shall justify itself.)

The way would thus be a „formal“ eidetic of the single subjectivity and intersubjectivity <at first>. This leads to the necessity (in order that they shall be „men“, i.e. spoken in a formal way: personal subjects, related to a world), to posit something transcendent as well, transcendent bodiliness with associatively corresponding „psychic lives“. The example of the experienced de facto nature then leads to the formal of nature in free variation. We certainly have transgressed the formal in the sense of the something. In contrast to that, which is empty formal in this sense we are now occupied with material things. But we still cannot only perform the method of the formal ideation in the binding at something as such in a world, but also in relation to purely subjective contents, even if they have nothing in common in their content, and thus for each and all taken together [332].[[12]](#footnote-12) And we also have noetic parallels as essential correlates in this universality. Therefore not the formally logical can be the beginning, but a formal consideration of the subjectivity in pure intuition.[[13]](#footnote-13)

Is it not consequent then to go over to nature, the necessary precondition of the intersubjectivity? Is it thus in logical naivety to go over into an empirographical eidetic of a nature as such, and to thus work out the *natura formaliter spectata*, as long as I simply do not have any logic? But at first without any regard for intersubjectivity. (Of course, the whole doctrine of association, everything I aimed at in my lectures on transcendental logic, then belongs to the egologically formal.) The intersubjective of the bodiliness then implies further bindings, the binding to an intersujective world that can be legitimated also with regard to the contingent qualities.

How about the ontology of the animals (the animality) then and of men, the „reasonable beings“? The animals do also have a common world with the natural basic. The difference between animal and man is not immediately in question. The formal ontology of the pure subjectivity is designed in the described necessary procdeure, and in the transition towards the completion completed in the intersubjectivity as well, and the zoological ontology is implied <in> that. Can we talk of an ontology of the animal surrounding world with importances that are instituted in a brute-animal way? How do we then arrive at the man, at „reason“?

The subject shall be able to cognize and justify truth. It shall be able to live and practically justify itself according to truth. It shall additionally be able to cognize values, cognize and differentiate right and not right values from the valuing life, and value according to cognized values. It shall not only harmoniously experience, and recognize some normally experienced thing, and live into a world of experience (keeping itself through many kinds of illusions) as a unity of experience, it shall be able to cognize a world as a truly being one, ask its objects of experience questions on the true being in detail and decide with reasons in an insightful way for truth as actual [333] actuality and falseness as an illusion. It shall be able to grasp the Whatever (the *katholou*), judge according to forms of the Whatever, and it shall [be able to] cognize and judge according to principle<s> the apodictic necessity and fundamental universality.

It shall be able to judge and act in exactly the axiological and practical forms of the Whatever (make and universally perform universal decisions) and [it shall] be able to universally justify them in logical cognizances that are based on corresponding universal actions of the emotion. And finally it <subjectivity> shall be able to perform universality in yet another way of thinking, valuing <and> acting that is closely linked to that: universality in the cognition as self-cognition (and community cognition in relation to universal humanity), universality in the judging of humanity and judging of the human surrounding world, universality in the practice in all these relations, that is, as fundamentally grounded.

One more time in a word: The animal shall be a reasonable being, shall be a man in the pregnant sense, a being, having implied and unfolding the idea of its truth, and having the idea of its axiologically practical truth as a practical norm, that is, like man for himself, thus humanity in the whole and man for himself only as a member of community.

And only here is the place for the formal logical disciplines, the doxic, axiological and practical logic as an empty formal one, but simply belonging only to humankind, simply being implied as inborn as a human essential form and essential norm for a true world as a correlate of reason, formally constituting the idea of man.[[14]](#footnote-14)

And again <it> is now necessary to uncover all ontology as a concrete logic belonging to the idea of man and his surrounding world as a human <surrounding world>, also the eidetic of the eidetically-empiriographically considered nature. The whole way started from man and his surrounding world, searched for the apodictically formal Apriori of free variation, seemingly in a distance to man, and eventually led to him as a particularity. But all these [334] options were thought by me, a man, and could only be thought by a man. They presupposed reason, and the reasonably thinking one as such. He had to be in connection to the thought, to all options, insofar as he thought otherwise of himself as well, but as a subject that remained and had to remain a man.

<c) Reflection on the genesis of the freely-fantasizing-me-myself. Every possible world necessarily remains a world of men, and thereby eventually bound to the fact of our world.>

We need to consider here the following as being of great importance: If I reconsider any mental processes I have, freely fantasizing in an intuitive way, then I am an actual I, and within fantasy, belonging to the freely fantasized mental process, a fantasy-I, a reproductive modification analogous to that of memory, in which I, as a memorized I am with the memorized, and yet I myself, I in my past; the current and the remembered I stand in the coincidence of identity. On the other hand though the reproductive I is merely a fantasized one, and thereby united with my current sense of present in its sense in quite another way. My actual I is an non-intuitional but determinate sense in every present; determinate insofar as it has to be evidently uncovered in rows of rememberings, that is, in such a way, that thereby the habituality belonging to the sense of present gains its original clarification, and the sense becomes evident in its determinacies. My whole current life of the past has attributed to that, and every past I with its sense and its acts is a pre-step to that, and is standing in a corresponding sense community with the sense of the present.

The fantasy-I though is not in the like community with me, its sense is only determined through the community with my current I, but at the same time through the fantasized mental process, struggling with my current mental process, and thereby with me myself. At first, the question is, how it may receive a harmonious sense and a determinate one, so that it is able to mentally live in such a way; or rather, if I accept it as an option, the option has to be an option at first by my thinking my I as correspondingly changed, otherwise corresponding with my actual <I> and [335] its actual habituality, but correspondingly changed in a way of a past life, and a habituality born from that, so that the respective mental process was able to make its appearance.[[15]](#footnote-15) Still we have to differentiate two cases here:

1. Newly emerging data of the senses, but also new mental processes of my surrounding world that emerge without my assistance, do not attack my past or not necessarily, insofar as they follow the harmonious style of the total experience, and the continuity of the past determinacies of the I, in which I have been, and from which I, the way I am, have become. The new can enormously determine me, also essentially attack my former habituality, as if I have to give up basic convictions. But in this kind of newly becoming and changing habituality I am always becoming. This belongs to the being in becoming of my I, and of an I as such.
2. Likewise my future personality is determined in the freely fantasizing otherwise of a present in that sense, that something else (actually and correspondingly) may emerge, than that, which actually emerges, but my personality, the way it is according to the whole content of the past) does not suffer from that.

It is something else if my new experience is not harmonious on that, which had been given by prior experience, or if <I> freely fantasize my judgements, my valuing statements, my actions, that is, for any present. They presuppose a preceding life, a preceding experiencing, preceding statements and habitualities growing from that, as if I freely fantasize to myself that I hate some beloved person, kill him, etc. Every such fiction presupposes for its option that I, as a corresponding fantasy-I, consider a corresponding variation of my former life or life-style, and thereby my corresponding style of being as changed as well, that is, radically change the sense of the fantasy-I in contrast to my current I despite the „coincidence“. Only in those cases have I considered another one, that is, another one who possibly is the way I could never be at all for my „individuality“, but not in the other [336] way that I could become without loosing my I, the way it was grounding for the becoming and now is.

If I now think of me otherwise in that way, I create myself a fantasy-I as a variation of my I by may considering it purely as that I that has certain mental processes and options of mental processes, e.g. that has a consequently harmonious experience of the world, lives into the experiencing world as an I in doing and leaving (without any consciousness of universality, without any universal thinking, valuing, wishing, and the like), then an infinity of the life, and of the habitual becoming, and thereby a sense is predelineated for the I, in which it needs to have become, and further needs to become. This sense then is not gained from my fantasizing into such ways of mental processes in such a way that I keep my own sense of being, and possible change it only that far that I could also have similar mental processes, but, as I said, without regard to my other determinate I. Certainly, I still freely fantasize myself otherwise, therefore the I-coincidence. This means: a form, belonging to a concrete I as such - like experiencing in its different modes (remembering, expecting) imagining, modalities of the belief, feeling in a valuing way, desiring, wishing and their modalities -, is preserved, and cannot be lost. We could say: I with Ego-life, egoical performing as a modality of the „something“. But beyond that the demanded and intuitively fantasized content of the mental process, and possibly endless, but intuitive style of life then exclusively determines, how the I has to be created in a more determinate way. (Likewise and not differently does it stand within the empathizing, if we, motivated by the bodily indication, want to make intuitive the undetermined subject of the mental processes that alone are indicated in a direct way. It is presented as empty, but it has a demanded sense beyond the form I.)

We connect the following thoughts to that now: if I fantasize myself into an I that has no reason or into a world without any reasonable beings, then I can of course ascribe an option to it: I can make statements on it, essential cognitions, nay, often gain a whole science, of course by my reason. But how does this come to pass? If I describe a thing of fantasy, then I am not only an actual I, but I in the fantasy, quasi being there as well, quasi experiencing, and quasi describing on the [337] basis of experience. And only thereby do I then have as an actual I, conscious of its presentness and existence, a current „description“, I claim as actual and not modified truth for the thing of fantasy. This means that my fantasy and my fantasy-I have extended, the fantasy-I is now not merely different, but also a reason-I. I am, if I describe the fantasy world, at the same time a present I, and as a fantasy-I experiencing in the fantasy world, and describing it on the basis of the (fantasy-) experiences. The describing I though is a stating I, comprehending, directed to truth and cognizing truth.

This implies: It is *a priori* included in every possible world that a „man“, „men“, reasonable beings can be adjointed to it as possibly belonging to it. But men are inconceivable without a human world. Man is not to be put into a world like dead household goods, but being as a man he necessarily lives in a world that is there for him, and has its sense and shape of the mind from him. Thus every possible world is a world for a subjectivity it is given to according to the surrounding world. However this subjectivity and its world may now be thought of, and [however] this may be made intuitive as a proof of its option in its shapes of the surrounding world, that is, the subjectivity in its correlative shapes, it is certain that this world has to be in the style of a human world. Only such variations are conceivable as being, as predicable, as theoretically cognizable, that can fit into a human world in the way of brute-animal surrounding worlds and worlds. But animal, subhuman worlds are no other worlds than the world of men, who are together with these animals, but variations, having the character of incomplete „appearances“ of the same world. There can be no superhuman world in the sense that is questionable here, since it can be made a member of a human world as a predicable one, and is subordinated to it in this sense. Thus the options of being, or rather, being variations of the world, encompassed in a human world and in man himself, necessarily enclose all ontological options, thus the animal world, that of the higher animals and the lower ones, but also the world of the madmen, etc.

[338] The animals do not „live“ into the human world, insofar as the world that is there for them cannot contain any men since they do not have any idea of reasonable acts, and only man, who has reason and lives in his human world, can give a sense to the locution that animals among other things of the world see men as well and that the animals experience the same world as men. These are ambiguous locutions we must not succumb to.[[16]](#footnote-16)

Every rational product, each, be it primitive, be it howsoever complicated, is only conceivable as a product of possible reasonable subjectivity, of a possible man in the formal sense, that is, already every option as an option (as truly being) and determining itself thus and thus, every possible statement, every science of options, that is, an ontology. We cannot conceive of the like otherwise than as a product of a reasonable forming, whereby the possible subjectivity may be a de facto one in the de facto world or <in> one that is varied somehow, just that it simply is a „human“ <world>.

But now we also have to say: I am, I live into my world. I cannot delete the fact. All options I can conceive of, are variations of this fact, therefore related back to it. All formations of thinking have their real rooting, which does not prevent that they were to be built as the same for others as well, and at other times, provided that the preconditions of the sense belong to them. Apriori formations belong to each conceivable reason-subjectivity. There also belongs the Apriori we have spoken of as essentially accepted in all formerly said, therefore the following as well, that each conceivable Apriori is bound to <the> facticity of a reasonable subjectivity. But this Apriori also presupposes the fact: we men.

[339] We begin the ontology with the positing „we and our world“ or with the positing of this world, us as experiencing, thinking, etc., subjects included therein. We change the fact. We incrementally build <up> the essential necessities for possible worlds, for possible subjects, we build up the ontological disciplines, and on the basis of the same then the Apriori as well for the sciences in relation to any possible world, that would then be presupposed as an actual one.

We thereby have not yet lost the ground of actuality. We are men, reasonable beings, live in a human world. Just because we are this we can set such tasks, and gain all options and sciences of options, this is what we ourselves have cognized as a sentence of ontological importance. There can only be one complete world, a human world; all eidetic variations receive their type. All other conceivable worlds are only conceivable from the ground of a human world, and thereby they can only be actual in the form of a human world. Since we are men, all options are only to be realized within the human world.

Of course, where we have incompossible options, one simply excludes the other. But that, which we have not seen in advance, is, that we, changing the human world and gaining all conceivabilities, remain within the type human world, into which all types have to fit. But at the same time the advantage of subjectivity comes to the fore. All worlds are surrounding worlds; and all Ego subjects that are conceivable in a compossible way, are included in a human world. If they are not mere options, if they shall be able to be true, they need to be in the respective de facto human world, in which I am de facto, and we are de facto Egos. This is an apriori sentence, and this implies: every possible and compossible subject is a self-contained all, related to a single world that is his. And it is accepted for each subject of this all that it may indeed think of other subjects and other worlds with other things, but that no subject thereof can actually be, unless: one that already in advance belongs to the horizon of actuality of the actual world of this actual I, and all de facto Egos.

[340]

Supplement XXVI

<The grasping of the essential style of my I, and of other Egos through endless self-variation>[[17]](#footnote-17)

If I say *ego cogito*, then I have intuitive only the current content of the present. The I has as a present I the poleform, but not merely that, an undiscovered sense as well, although one that is to be disclosed in infinity. I am with my determinate habituality, and <in order> to disclose it, I would have to disclose my genesis in continuing remembering; thus only thereby do I gain actual intuition as to what I am. An endless task. But this unsolved task is still guided by the sense „I“, which, even if it is unclear, still it is vivid, which is not to be understood merely as a universal sense here, but as the determinate one of the moment, changing with every new act. And yet I am the same. The pole is identical, and the universal form of the sense preserves itself, within which I am always identically the same in the becoming on and changing of my habituality.[[18]](#footnote-18)

If I think myself to be otherwise, then I have the intuition of a fantasylike mental process in the struggle with what I actually live, of a fantasylike hating where I love, verifying where I deny, etc. But in order to gain an actual intuition of me and my concrete life, the way I was if I behaved in a way different from the actual way, I would have to disclose the current sense I, and my whole genesis, and make intuitive to me, how it would have to procede, in order that I could and would have to behave in that way. But I was always already with a determinate acquired sense. The task is endless.

But iteratively it leads to relative options, concordantly, whereby the always corresponding, undetermined „I“ is the index of the continuation of the possible intuitional illustration. I grasp the essential style of the option of another I (as a self-variation) in its infinity in this infinity, or rather, iteration, and succeeding intuitiveness in the unit of a possible fantasized life that has already run its course, and <that>, which belongs to it as an essential form, as some essentially necessary thing. I gain the evidence that the sense „I“ has to ever again be considered as originally having become from [341] a possible life, if I set the demand that it shall be <that> I, which would comport itself in this and that way, the way I grasp it as an intuitive option of some behavior in an empty undisclosed I, and in the struggle with the current empty I.

Likewise in the empathy: The empathized I is empty, at first an analogon of my I, and yet sensibly struggling with my I (in my momentary sense), and not only struggling with regard to what experiences, feelings, mental processes as such I assign to the felt I, while I do not live it myself. But just as I can [conceive of] myself in the fantasizing as different, I can conceive of this indicated I as an option, that is, in such a way that <I> could then quasi-experience from that which <is> assigned to it, that which is indicated outside of the body as motivated in the genesis, as adjusted to a concrete life, by this empty I determining itself in the mode of possibility, and harmoniously building up its habituality.

1. October 1926. Last meditation of the holiday. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. But how is this common world - surrounding world - determined? Here is the relativity and the problem. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. But the surrounding world is an empty frame then. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. But are the difficulties and problems not already there? [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Beginning with the formal ontology of the „We, and the surrounding world“. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The contrast of the variations needed to be performed in a clearer way. I still always vary on the basis of exemplary concretion, but compare something particulars on the following page (= page 329, 1-29, German edition). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Accordingly also and prior to that a radical grounding of the universal science on the basis of positivity, leading beyond that of universal ontology. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Ontology, purely beginning as a personal formal ontology, and surrounding world in formal indeterminateness (correlative). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Formal world as a correlate form of a formal community of persons. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Formal sense of nature: A nature, formally <considered>, has to be, in order that others can be for me. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. View the final pages <= pages 337, 7-339,37>. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. In a word: Logic is not only related to something objective in the world. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The first <is> the formal ontology of the pure subjectivity. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Does the logical formal structure of the world have to be reconsidered once more? [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Compare on this supplement XXVI (pages 340f.). - Editor‘s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. The sense of being, constituted as a world for an animal subjectivity, is another one than the one for us men and for possible men as such. But: The being of the animals and that of their world presupposes men and human world, of which it makes itself a member. And apart from that the community between man and animal, reciprocal understanding is grounded and it is therefore similar as between men of different steps of reason. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. October 1926. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. N(ota) b(ene): How do I cognize the option that I would be different than I am, as the option of another I, a foreign one? I as an empty, undisclosed habitual sense (with an identical pole and constantly changing habitual content of determination) within the „I am“. Infinity of the disclosure, that is, infinity of the I. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)